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I.  INTRODUCTION 
The Supreme Court’s decision in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals1 has 
had wide-ranging impact.  Codified in Federal Rule of Evidence 702, federal 
courts are now required to act as “gatekeepers” to ensure that expert evidence is 
both relevant and reliable.  Courts have applied the principles articulated in the 
Daubert decision in an ever-expanding range of cases, including not only 
product liability and mass tort cases where the doctrine was originally 
developed,2 but also antitrust, securities, commercial, and environmental 
contamination cases.3  Indeed, any case in which scientific or technical expert 
evidence is presented is a candidate for a challenge under Daubert to the 
reliability and relevance of a party’s expert evidence. 
Decisions regarding the admissibility of expert evidence under Rule 702 and 
Daubert are frequently dispositive.  Wherever expert testimony is submitted or 
required to establish various elements of a plaintiff’s claim, review by the trial 
court under Rule 702 and Daubert has the potential to bar plaintiff’s claims in 
part or in their entirety.  Even where Daubert motions are not completely 
successful, they can have the effect of significantly shaping the issues for trial.  
Accordingly, parties in large-scale litigation frequently expend great effort in 
litigating the scientific and technical basis for their claims before the trial judge.  
Thus, it comes as no surprise that parties in patent litigation are increasingly 
challenging the admissibility of expert testimony under Rule 702 and Daubert.  
These challenges initially focused on the plaintiff’s damages case, gaining 
support with the Federal Circuit decisions in Lucent,4 ResQNet,5 Uniloc,6 and 
LaserDynamics7 and building on the common-law principle that damages may 
not be speculative.  However, challenges to other types of expert testimony are 
increasingly common.  Thus, for example, litigants have challenged proffered 
expert testimony on infringement, claim construction, and enablement.  Given 
                                                                                                                   
 1 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993). 
 2 See, e.g., Johnson v. Arkema, Inc., 685 F.3d 452 (5th Cir. 2012); Pluck v. BP Oil Pipeline Co., 
640 F.3d 671 (6th Cir. 2011); Knight v. Kirby Inland Marine Inc., 482 F.3d 347 (5th Cir. 2007); 
Dodge v. Cotter Corp., 328 F.3d 1212 (10th Cir. 2003); Moore v. Ashland Chem. Inc., 151 F.3d 
269 (5th Cir. 1998); Barrett v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 95 F.3d 375 (5th Cir. 1996); McClain v. 
Metabolife Int’l, Inc., 401 F.3d 1233, 1251–52 (11th Cir. 2005). 
 3 See, e.g., In re Williams Sec. Litig.-WCG Subclass, 558 F.3d 1130 (10th Cir. 2009) (securities); 
Ky. Speedway, LLC v. Nat’l Ass’n of Stock Car Auto Racing, Inc., 588 F.3d 908 (6th Cir. 2009) 
(antitrust); Craftsmen Limousine, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 363 F.3d 761 (8th Cir. 2004) (antitrust); 
In re TMI Litig., 193 F.3d 613 (3d Cir. 1999) (environmental contamination). 
 4 Lucent Technologies, Inc. v. Gateway, Inc., 580 F.3d 1301 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
 5 ResQNet.com, Inc. v. Lansa, Inc., 594 F.3d 860 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
 6 Uniloc USA, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 632 F.3d 1292 (Fed. Cir. 2011). 
 7 LaserDynamics, Inc. v. Quanta Computer, Inc., 694 F.3d 51 (Fed. Cir. 2012). 
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that Daubert presents another opportunity for a litigant to derail or limit an 
opponent’s claims, the frequency of such challenges, which can have significant 
impact on the litigation, is only likely to increase.  Indeed, recent decisions in 
high-profile patent cases have only added to the likelihood that litigants will 
seek to invoke Daubert in future cases. 
Part II of this Article discusses the general principles articulated in Daubert 
and subsequent decisions interpreting Rule 702.  These decisions provide 
significant guidance regarding general principles that may be applied in 
assessing the relevance and reliability of proffered scientific evidence, including 
in the patent context.  The Supreme Court has made clear that the scrutiny of 
expert evidence under Rule 702 and Daubert is rigorous, designed to ensure that 
any expert testimony upon which a party seeks to rely is both relevant and 
reliable, and that the expert is qualified to offer the opinions for which the 
expert is being offered.     
Part III then discusses application of Daubert in the context of patent 
litigation, beginning first with its application to expert opinions regarding 
damages and then its expansion into other areas of expert testimony.  As in 
other areas, many of the principles applied in analyzing Daubert issues in the 
patent context are not unique.  Courts seek to ensure that an expert’s testimony 
is sufficiently reliable to be admissible and that the expert’s opinions are 
sufficiently related to the issues in the case.  Nonetheless, patent cases present a 
whole new set of circumstances in which Daubert principles may be applied, 
given the wide range of experts that frequently testify in such cases and the 
unique role of the courts in deciding other threshold matters.  
II.  THE PRINCIPLES ARTICULATED IN DAUBERT 
Under Rule 702 and Daubert, federal trial courts must serve as gatekeepers to 
ensure that any and all scientific testimony or evidence admitted is not only 
relevant, but reliable.8  As the Supreme Court recognized in its subsequent 
decision in Weisgram v. Marley, under Rule 702, expert testimony must meet 
“exacting standards of reliability.”9  The burden is on the proponent of expert 
testimony to show by a preponderance of proof that the expert meets each of 
the Daubert requirements.10  The requirements apply not only to purely 
“scientific” evidence, but to all expert testimony involving “technical” or “other 
                                                                                                                   
 8 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 589 (1993) (“[T]he trial judge must ensure 
that any and all scientific testimony or evidence admitted is not only relevant, but reliable.”).  
 9 Weisgram v. Marley Co., 528 U.S. 440, 455 (2000). 
 10 509 U.S. at 592 n.10.   
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specialized” knowledge.11  In patent cases, the district court looks to the law of 
the regional circuit in determining the admissibility of expert evidence under 
Rule 702 and Daubert.12  
Among other things, Rule 702 requires that expert witnesses (1) base their 
opinions upon sufficient facts or data, (2) develop their opinions using reliable 
principles and methods, and (3) apply those principles and methods reliably to 
the facts of the case.13  In addition, expert witnesses must be qualified by 
knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education to offer their opinions.14  
Expert opinions that fail to meet these requirements are inadmissible.15 
The text of Rule 702 provides some guidance with respect to the nature of 
the inquiry.  The rule requires that an expert’s testimony be based on 
“scientific . . . knowledge,”16 which courts have interpreted as implying that the 
expert’s opinions have a “grounding in the methods and procedures of 
science.”17  Expert testimony cannot be based on mere “subjective belief or 
unsupported speculation.”18   
Accordingly, under Rule 702’s reliability prong, proposed testimony must be 
supported by “appropriate validation”—what the Supreme Court in Daubert 
labeled “ ‘good grounds,’ based on what is known.”19  An expert’s mere 
assurance that the expert has utilized generally accepted principles is 
insufficient.20  Rather, there must be some independent basis for concluding 
that the expert’s opinions meet the requirements under Rule 702.  
Not only must expert opinion be based on sufficient facts and data, but it 
must be “the product of reliable principles and methods” that are reliably 
applied to the facts of the case.21  “[T]he reliability analysis applies to all aspects 
of an expert’s testimony: the methodology, the facts underlying the expert’s 
opinion, [and] the link between the facts and the conclusion.”22  In sum, an 
                                                                                                                   
 11 Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 141 (1999) (“We conclude that Daubert’s 
general holding—setting forth the trial judge’s general ‘gatekeeping’ obligation—applies not only 
to testimony based on ‘scientific’ knowledge, but also to testimony based on ‘technical’ and ‘other 
specialized’ knowledge.”).  See also FED. R. EVID. 702 advisory committee note (2000 
amendments) (“An opinion from an expert who is not a scientist should receive the same degree 
of scrutiny for reliability as an opinion from an expert who purports to be a scientist.”). 
 12 Micro Chem., Inc. v. Lextron, Inc., 317 F.3d 1387, 1390–91 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 
 13 FED. R. EVID. 702. 
 14 Id. 
 15 McCorvey v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 298 F.3d 1253, 1256 (11th Cir. 2002).  
 16 Daubert, 509 U.S. at 590 n.8. 
 17 Id. at 590. 
 18 Id.  
 19 Id.  
 20 Brown v. Illinois Cent. R.R. Co., 705 F.3d 531, 536 (5th Cir. 2013). 
 21 FED. R. EVID. 702. 
 22 Heller v. Shaw Indus., Inc., 167 F.3d 146, 155 (3d Cir. 1999). 
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expert must “employ[ ] in the courtroom the same level of intellectual rigor that 
characterizes the practice of an expert in the relevant field.”23   
Under Daubert’s relevance prong, expert evidence must assist the trier of fact 
to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue.  The Supreme Court 
has characterized this language as imposing, among other things, a requirement 
of “fit” between the expert’s proposed testimony and the facts and 
circumstances of the case.24  In other words, an expert’s opinion must be 
“sufficiently tied to the facts of the case that it will aid the jury in resolving a 
factual dispute.”25  As the Supreme Court explained in General Electric Co. v. 
Joiner, expert testimony is inadmissible where “there is simply too great an 
analytical gap between the data and the opinion proffered.”26  “[N]othing in 
either Daubert or the Federal Rules of Evidence requires a district court to admit 
opinion evidence that is connected to existing data only by the ipse dixit of the 
expert.”27   
Finally, the expert must be qualified to offer each of the expert’s opinions.28  
In assessing this prong under Rule 702, courts seek to ensure that the expert has 
specific qualifications that fit the specific opinions the expert is intending to 
offer.29  “The issue with regard to expert testimony is not the qualifications of a 
witness in the abstract, but whether those qualifications provide a foundation 
for a witness to answer a specific question.”30  
In applying these requirements, courts thoroughly scrutinize proffered 
expert testimony to ensure that the Daubert requirements are met at “every step” 
of an expert’s analysis.31  “[A]ny step that renders the analysis unreliable under 
the Daubert factors renders the expert’s testimony inadmissible.”32  “The analysis 
outlined in Daubert is extensive, requiring the district court to carefully and 
meticulously review the proffered scientific evidence.”33   
Novel and unsupported theories are inadmissible under Daubert.  While such 
theories may be sufficient to generate hypotheses in the scientific arena, they 
                                                                                                                   
 23 Kumho Tire, 526 U.S. at 152. 
 24 Daubert, 509 U.S. at 591. 
 25 Id.   
 26 522 U.S. 136, 146 (1997). 
 27 Id. at 137. 
 28 FED. R. EVID. 702 (witness must be “qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, 
training, or education”). 
 29 See, e.g., Berry v. City of Detroit, 25 F.3d 1342, 1351 (6th Cir. 1994); Ralston v. Smith & 
Nephew Richards, Inc., 275 F.3d 965, 969-70 (10th Cir. 2001); Wheeling Pittsburgh Steel Corp. v. 
Beelman River Terminals, Inc., 254 F.3d 706, 715 (8th Cir. 2001).  
 30 Berry v. City of Detroit, 25 F.3d 1342, 1351 (6th Cir. 1994). 
 31 Amorgianos v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 303 F.3d 256, 267 (2d Cir. 2002). 
 32 In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig., 35 F.3d 717, 745 (3d Cir. 1994) (emphasis omitted).   
 33 Miller v. Pfizer, Inc., 356 F.3d 1326, 1335 (10th Cir. 2004), quoting United States v. Call, 129 
F.3d 1402, 1405 (10th Cir. 1997). 
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provide an inadequate foundation for the admissibility of an expert’s opinions 
in a court of law.34  “[W]hat science treats as a useful but untested hypothesis 
the law should generally treat as inadmissible speculation.”35   
III.  THE EXPANDING APPLICATION OF DAUBERT IN PATENT CASES 
Litigants are increasingly asking federal courts to apply these principles in 
patent cases.  While parties initially raised Daubert and Rule 702 in the context 
of damages as a natural extension of case law holding that damages could not 
be speculative, as litigants had success in mounting such challenges, their use 
has expanded.  As one magistrate judge recently observed, “Daubert motions 
used to be relatively rare in patent cases, and Daubert challenges to damages 
experts rarer still, [b]ut with a few high profile successes, now every patent trial 
lawyer worth her salt brings a challenge to the damages opinions offered by her 
adversary.”36    
In recent years, the application of Daubert has expanded beyond the subject 
of damages to other kinds of expert testimony in patent cases.  Expert opinions 
relating to infringement or patent validity, for example, have increasingly been 
the subject of Daubert challenges.  This is not particularly surprising given the 
general expansion of Daubert in many areas of the law as well as the wide range 
of different kinds of expert testimony that may arise in the context of patent 
litigation.  As the Federal Circuit has remarked in the context of expert 
testimony at the Markman stage,  
extrinsic evidence in the form of expert testimony can be useful 
to a court for a variety of purposes, such as to provide 
background on the technology at issue, to explain how an 
invention works, to ensure that the court’s understanding of the 
technical aspects of the patent is consistent with that of a person 
of skill in the art, or to establish that a particular term in the 
patent or the prior art as a particular meaning in the pertinent 
field.37 
                                                                                                                   
 34 Rosen v. Ciba-Geigy Corp., 78 F.3d 316, 319 (7th Cir. 1996) (“Law lags science; it does not 
lead it.”); Moore v. Ashland Chem. Inc., 151 F.3d 269, 276 (5th Cir. 1998) (“[T]he law cannot 
wait for future scientific investigation and research.  We must resolve cases in our courts on the 
basis of scientific knowledge that is currently available.”). 
 35 Tamraz v, Lincoln Elec. Co., 620 F.3d 665, 677 (6th Cir. 2010). 
 36 Dynetix Design Solutions, Inc. v. Synopsys, Inc., 2013 WL 4538210, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 
22, 2013). 
 37 Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 
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Accordingly, with the rise in the use of expert evidence, challenges under Rule 
702 and Daubert are becoming increasingly common in patent litigation. 
A.  DAMAGES 
The principles governing the analysis of expert evidence with respect to 
patent damages are relatively well-established.  They add to a framework for 
assessing damages that pre-dates Daubert and Rule 702 in which courts have laid 
out the appropriate measures and means of calculating damages in patent cases.  
Under this framework, where infringement is proven, a patentee is entitled to 
“damages adequate to compensate for the infringement, but in no event less 
than a reasonable royalty for the use made of the invention by the infringer.”38  
Two alternative categories of compensation for patent infringement are the 
patentee’s lost profits and the reasonable royalty the patentee would have 
received through arms-length bargaining.39  A reasonable royalty is “ ‘the floor 
below which damages shall not fall,’ ”40 and is typically based on a hypothetical 
negotiation between the patentee and the infringer at the time the infringement 
began.41  “The hypothetical negotiation tries, as best as possible, to recreate the 
ex ante licensing negotiation scenario and to describe the resulting agreement.”42   
The court’s decision in Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. United States Plywood Corp. 
provides a frequently cited list of factors that may be considered in determining 
a reasonable royalty and which have been extended in subsequent decisions.43  
Experts often use these factors as a basis for ascertaining a reasonable royalty to 
compensate for patent infringement.  Accordingly, it is not surprising that one 
                                                                                                                   
 38 35 U.S.C. § 284. 
 39 Lucent Technologies, Inc. v. Gateway, Inc., 580 F.3d 1301, 1324 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (citing 
Panduit Corp. v. Stahlin Bros. Fibre Works, Inc., 575 F.2d 1152, 1157 (6th Cir. 1978)). 
 40 Lucent, 580 F.3d at 1324 (quoting Bandag, Inc. v. Gerrard Tire Co., 704 F.2d 1578, 1583 (Fed. 
Cir. 1983)). 
 41 Unisplay, S.A. v. American Elec. Sign Co., 69 F.3d 512, 517 (Fed. Cir. 1995). 
 42 Lucent, 580 F.3d at 1325. 
 43 Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. U.S. Plywood Corp., 318 F. Supp. 1116, 1120 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).  
These factors include: (1) established royalty rate for the patent; (2) license rates paid for 
comparable patents; (3) type of license (exclusive/non-exclusive or restricted/non-restricted; (4) 
licensor’s established licensing policies; (5) competitive relationship between licensor and licensee; 
(6) convoyed sales; (7) duration and terms of the license; (8) commercial success and established 
profitability; (9) advantages over old methods; (10) nature of patented invention and benefits to 
those that use it; (11) extent of use of the patent by the infringer; (12) customary industry rate for 
invention or analogous inventions; (13) portion of profit that should be credited to the invention 
as distinguished from non-patented elements, manufacturing process, business risks, or significant 
features added by the infringer; (14) opinion testimony of qualified experts; and (15) amount that 
licensor and licensee would have agreed upon.  Id.  The Federal Circuit “sanction[ed] the use of 
the Georgia Pacific factors to frame the reasonable royalty” in its decision in Uniloc USA, Inc. v. 
Microsoft Corp., 632 F.3d 1292, 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2011). 
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of the first areas in which courts began applying Daubert and Rule 702 in patent 
cases was in the context of ascertaining the admissibility of expert damages 
testimony.  
As a result, today there is a relatively robust body of case law applying Rule 
702 and Daubert in the context of patent damages.  In the last decade, the 
Federal Circuit has issued a string of decisions that have provided significant 
guidance with respect to both the relevance and reliability prong under Rule 
702.  These decisions have focused on ensuring that damages calculations “fit” 
the facts of the case by accurately placing a value on the harm caused by the 
alleged infringement while simultaneously ensuring that damages opinions are 
based on evidence that is “reliable and tangible . . . not conjecture or 
speculative.”44 
1.  The Federal Circuit’s Damages Framework.  While not a decision addressing 
Rule 702 or Daubert because such challenges were not raised at the district 
court, the Federal Circuit’s decision in Lucent Technologies, Inc. v. Gateway, Inc. is 
one of the seminal decisions addressing patent damages that is frequently cited 
in subsequent decisions under Daubert and Rule 702.  In Lucent, the Federal 
Circuit held that a damages award for infringement of a patent for a method of 
entering information into fields on a computer screen without using a keyboard 
was not supported by substantial evidence.45  The court found that some of the 
license agreements upon which the plaintiff’s damages expert based the 
reasonable royalty calculation were “radically different from the hypothetical 
agreement under consideration.”46  The court held that “a lump-sum damages 
award cannot stand solely on evidence which amounts to little more than a 
recitation of royalty numbers, one of which is arguably in the ballpark of the 
jury’s award, particularly when it is doubtful that the technology of those license 
agreements is in any way similar to the technology being litigated . . . .”47  
Although the jury’s verdict was based on a lump sum and not a running 
royalty, the Federal Circuit held that to the extent the jury implicitly based its 
award on an application of the entire market value rule, the award was not 
supported by substantial evidence.48  The court noted that the defendant’s 
product (Microsoft’s Outlook) was “an enormously complex software program 
comprising hundreds, if not thousands or even more, features,” and rejected the 
suggestion that “the use of one small feature, the date-picker, constitutes a 
                                                                                                                   
 44 Uniloc, 632 F.3d at 1318. 
 45 580 F.3d 1301 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
 46 Id. at 1327–28. 
 47 Id. at 1329. 
 48 Id. at 1324–25 (noting that jury awarded a lump sum and indicated no amount on the verdict 
form’s line for a running royalty). 
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substantial portion of the value of Outlook.”49  The program consisted of 
millions of lines of code, “only a tiny fraction of which encodes the date-picker 
feature.”50  The court observed that “numerous features other than the date-
picker appear to account for the overwhelming majority of the consumer 
demand and therefore significant profit.”51  Thus, assuming the jury did apply 
the entire market value rule to award the lump-sum royalty, the court held such 
an application would amount to legal error.52 
In ResQNet.com, Inc. v. Lansa, Inc., the Federal Circuit likewise vacated a 
damages award for infringement of patents relating to screen recognition 
software used to facilitate terminal emulation.  The court noted that “a 
reasonable royalty analysis requires a court to hypothesize, not to speculate.”53  
“At all times, the damages inquiry must concentrate on compensation for the 
economic harm caused by infringement of the claimed invention.”54  Following 
its prior decision in Lucent, the court found that the license agreements that 
served as the basis for plaintiff’s reasonable royalty analysis were not sufficiently 
comparable to the technology at issue to serve as a reliable basis for a damages 
analysis.  Rather, the court found that the expert “used licenses with no 
relationship to the claimed invention to drive the royalty rate up to unjustified 
double-digit levels.”55  The license agreements did not mention the patents in 
suit or show “any other discernible link to the claimed technology.”56  As the 
court noted, it had “long required district courts performing reasonable royalty 
calculations to exercise vigilance when considering past licenses to technologies 
other than the patent in suit.”57   
In Uniloc USA, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., the court rejected “a matter of Federal 
Circuit law” the 25% rule of thumb, a longstanding standard for calculating a 
reasonable royalty.58  Building on its prior decisions, the court concluded that, 
despite the rule’s longstanding pedigree, it was “a fundamentally flawed tool for 
determining a baseline royalty rate in a hypothetical negotiation” and thus was 
“inadmissible under Daubert and the Federal Rules of Evidence, because it fails 
                                                                                                                   
 49 Id. at 1332. 
 50 Id.  
 51 Id. at 1333. 
 52 Id. at 1337. 
 53 ResQNet.com, Inc. v. Lansa, Inc., 594 F.3d 860, 869 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
 54 Id. 
 55 Id. at 870. 
 56 Id. 
 57 Id. at 869.  See also Wordtech Sys. v. Integrated Networks Solutions, Inc., 609 F.3d 1308, 
1320 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (“[C]omparisons of past patent licenses to the infringement must account 
for ‘the technological and economic differences’ between them.” (quoting ResQnet.com, 594 F.3d 
at 873)). 
 58 Uniloc USA, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 632 F.3d 1292, 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2011). 
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to tie a reasonable royalty base to the facts of the case at issue.”59  The court 
observed that “[t]he bottom line of Kumho Tire and [General Electric Co. v.] Joiner 
is that one major determinant of whether an expert should be excluded under 
Daubert is whether he has justified the application of a general theory to the 
facts of the case.”60  The court thereby extended the framework the court had 
developed for analyzing expert damages testimony by invoking the principles 
under Rule 702 and Daubert.   
As the court observed, its prior decisions made clear that “there must be a 
basis in fact to associate the royalty rates used in prior licenses to the particular 
hypothetical negotiation at issue in the case.”61  However, the court found that 
the 25% rule of thumb “as an abstract and largely theoretical construct fails to 
satisfy this fundamental requirement.”62  This was because “[t]he rule does not 
say anything about a particular hypothetical negotiation or reasonable royalty 
involving any particular technology, industry or party.”63  Accordingly, the court 
determined that the 25% rule of thumb was an even more unreliable and 
irrelevant basis for the royalty rate than the unrelated licenses at issue in 
ResQNet and Lucent.   
In LaserDynamics, Inc. v. Quanta Computer, Inc., the Federal Circuit expanded 
upon this line of cases by holding that a damages expert must apportion down 
to the “smallest salable patent-practicing unit” in a case involving patents 
relating to optical disc drives.  The court reasoned that, “[w]here small elements 
of multi-component products are accused of infringement, calculating a royalty 
on the entire product carries a considerable risk that the patentee will be 
improperly compensated for non-infringing components of that product.”64  
Thus, the court held, “it is generally required that royalties be based not on the 
entire product, but instead on the ‘smallest salable patent-practicing unit.’ ”65  
As the court observed, it was common for products, particularly electronic 
devices, to include numerous distinct components, many of which may be 
separately patented.66  Accordingly, it was particularly important in such cases to 
ensure that an expert’s damages analysis fit the precise facts of the case and not 
over-compensate plaintiffs for technology that was not related to the patents at 
issue. 
                                                                                                                   
 59 Id. 
 60 Id. at 1316 (quoting ResQNet.com, 594 F.3d at 869). 
 61 Id. at 1317. 
 62 Id. 
 63 Id. 
 64 LaserDynamics, Inc. v. Quanta Computer, Inc., 694 F.3d 51, 67 (Fed. Cir. 2012). 
 65 Id. (quoting Cornell Univ. v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 609 F. Supp. 2d 279, 283 (N.D.N.Y. 2009)). 
 66 Id. at 66. 
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This conclusion flowed not only from the principle that damages should fit 
the precise injury alleged, but also from the requirement that damages be 
reliable and not speculative.  As the court observed, the Federal Circuit had 
previously noted that “ ‘a reasonable royalty analysis requires a court to 
hypothesize, not to speculate . . . [T]he trial court must carefully tie proof of 
damages to the claimed invention’s footprint in the market place.’ ”67  “A 
damages theory must be based on ‘sound economic and factual predicates.’ ”68 
The court concluded that the expert’s opinion failed to satisfy these 
requirements.  The expert had not conducted any market studies or consumer 
surveys to ascertain whether the demand for laptop computers was driven by 
the patented optical disc drive technology.  Rather, the court concluded that 
“the patented method is best understood as a useful commodity-type feature 
that consumers expect will be present in all laptop computers.”69  The expert 
did not present any evidence that this patented feature alone motivated 
consumers to purchase a laptop computer.  Moreover, the court concluded that 
the one-third apportionment factor the expert applied to reduce the royalty 
“appears to have been plucked out of thin air based on vague qualitative 
notions of the relative importance of the ODD technology.”70  The court 
agreed with the district court that the expert supplied “no credible economic 
analysis” to support the apportionment factor, and thus the expert’s opinion 
was akin to the 25% rule of thumb that the court invalidated in Uniloc.71 
Finally, in Power Integrations, Inc. v. Fairchild Semiconductor International, Inc., the 
Federal Circuit similarly held that admission of an expert’s damages opinions 
was an abuse of discretion where the expert based the opinions on unreliable 
assumptions and data.  The court determined that the expert’s opinions were 
“unreliable in several respects.”72  As a threshold matter, the court concluded 
that the source of the information upon which the expert relied for his 
estimates of Samsung’s worldwide sales was “unclear,” given that the expert 
                                                                                                                   
 67 Id. at 67 (quoting ResQNet.com, 594 F.3d at 869). 
 68 Id. (quoting Riles v. Shell Exploration & Prod. Co., 298 F.3d 1302, 1311 (Fed. Cir. 2002)).  See 
also DSU Med. Corp. v. JMS Co., 471 F.3d 1293, 1309 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (noting that, under the 
Federal Circuit’s decision in Grain Processing, “th[e] court requires sound economic proof of the 
nature of the market and likely outcomes with infringement out of the picture” and that “the 
concept of sound economic proof requires some grounding in ‘sound economic and factual 
predicates’”). 
 69 LaserDynamics, 694 F.3d at 69. 
 70 Id. 
 71 Id.  See also Uniloc, 632 F.3d at 1318 (a patentee “must in every case give evidence tending to 
separate or apportion the defendant’s profits and the patentee’s damages between the patented 
feature and the unpatented features,” and that evidence must be “reliable and tangible . . . not 
conjecture or speculative”). 
 72 Power Integrations, Inc. v. Fairchild Semiconductor Int’l, Inc., 711 F.3d 1348, 1373 (Fed. 
Cir. 2013). 
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could not explain where the information came from and “assumed” that the 
material was taken from the Internet.73  In addition, the court concluded that 
the expert “made two speculative leaps.”74  The expert relied upon data 
regarding shipments of Samsung phones, assuming that each Samsung mobile 
phone included a charger and that each of these chargers incorporated an 
infringing power circuit.  However, the documents upon which the expert relied 
did not “provide any reliable link which might indicate that the shipped phones 
included chargers” and thus the expert could not “safely assume that all of these 
shipments must have included a charger.”75  Moreover, the court noted that the 
“sales document lists no model numbers or other indicia from which [the 
expert] could reasonably infer that chargers assumed to be included 
incorporated . . . infringing power circuits.”  As the court observed, several 
other companies sold competing power circuits to Samsung and thus “at least 
some of Samsung’s chargers could have incorporated the competing power 
circuits or Power Integrations’ own circuits, which do not infringe.”76  Plaintiff’s 
expert provided no basis to distinguish between infringing and noninfringing 
chargers, and the court concluded that “his assumption that all chargers 
incorporated an infringing power circuit was speculation.”77  Thus, the court 
held that the expert’s opinion was “derived from unreliable data and built on 
speculation,” “[was] too far removed from the facts of th[e] case,” and “lack[ed] 
the hallmarks of genuinely useful expert testimony.”78 
2.  The District Courts.  The district courts have applied these principles in 
excluding expert damages testimony that does not meet the requirements of 
Rule 702 and Daubert in a variety of diverse contexts, including in several recent 
high-profile decisions.  While many of these cases involve straightforward 
application of the Federal Circuit’s decisions in cases such as Lucent, ResqNet.com 
and LaserDynamics, others involve broader issues, with courts looking to general 
Daubert principles to asses both the relevance and reliability of expert damages 
testimony. 
  a.  Apportionment of Damages.  Following Federal Circuit precedent, 
apportionment of damages is a frequent basis for motions to exclude expert 
damages opinions in the district courts.  In Rembrandt Social Media, LP v. 
Facebook, Inc., for example, the district court excluded the opinion of plaintiff’s 
damages expert in a case alleging that Facebook infringed a patent describing a 
                                                                                                                   
 73 Id. 
 74 Id. 
 75 Id. at 1373–74. 
 76 Id. at 1374. 
 77 Id. 
 78 Id. 
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method for implementing a web page diary.79  The court concluded that 
plaintiff’s expert failed to properly apportion the defendant’s revenue due to 
features that were alleged to infringe plaintiff’s patent.  As a result, the expert 
claimed damages “ ‘far in excess of the contribution of the claimed invention to 
the market’ and thus claimed ‘more than the ‘damages adequate to compensate 
for the infringement.’ ”80   
The court observed that it was not always sufficient to apportion down to 
the smallest salable unit and that further apportionment may be required: “The 
smallest salable unit must be closely tied to the patent to suffice, and further 
apportionment is required even when ‘the accused product is the smallest 
salable unit’ . . . if the ‘smallest salable unit is still a multi-component product 
encompassing non-patent related features.’ ”81  By way of example, the court 
cited the Federal Circuit’s decision in Lucent that sales of the Outlook program 
could not serve as a basis for the royalty base where plaintiff alleged that only 
one feature of the program infringed.  This was true even though the multi-
component Outlook program was the smallest salable unit in the case.  Thus, 
the court concluded that the expert’s use of the entire value of certain features 
that could be used independently without infringing as the royalty base was “a 
mistake of the same kind as allowing [plaintiff’s] expert to use the entire value 
of Facebook.”82 
The court concluded that the expert’s analysis of customer surveys to 
calculate the royalty rate was unreliable for similar reasons.  The expert assumed 
without explanation that the weighted importance of any given feature of 
Facebook was equal to the same percentage of advertising revenue.  The expert 
failed to perform an analysis to explain why the weighted importance of some 
feature to a user directly correlated with a certain percentage of Facebook’s 
advertising revenue.  The court therefore found the expert’s methodology 
“suspect” and “unreliable under Rule 702.”83 
Finally, in Dynetix Design Solutions, Inc. v. Synopsys, Inc., the court excluded the 
opinions of plaintiff’s damages expert on multiple grounds, including the failure 
of the expert to properly apportion damages.84  The court observed that 
apportionment was required to determine the smallest salable infringing unit 
with close relation to the claimed invention.  However, plaintiff’s expert based 
                                                                                                                   
 79 Rembrandt Social Media, LP v. Facebook, Inc., 22 F. Supp. 3d 585 (E.D. Va. 2013). 
 80 Id. at 594 (quoting Cornell Univ., 609 F. Supp. 2d at 283–84). 
 81 Id. (quoting Synetix Design Solutions, Inc. v. Synopsys, Inc., 2013 WL 4538210 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 22, 
2013)). 
 82 Id. at 595. 
 83 Id. at 596. 
 84 Dynetix Design Solutions, Inc. v. Synopsys, Inc., No. C 11-05973PSG, 2013 WL 4538210, at 
*2 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 22, 2013). 
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the damages calculation on an “optional feature” of the allegedly infringing 
product, which had the patented feature at issue as only “one component.”85  In 
addition, the court concluded that the expert “impermissibly assumed based on 
no facts in this particular case that the starting point for a hypothetical 
negotiation” over a reasonable royalty rate “would be 50% of the gross profit 
margin.”86  The expert purported to base the 50% figure on “his own 
experience and judgment,” but the court concluded that this was an arbitrary 
figure that was akin to the 25% starting figure the Federal Circuit rejected as 
unreliable in Uniloc.87 
  b.  Relevance of Underlying Data.  Courts have similarly ruled that reliance on 
data that is too far removed from the facts of the case renders an expert’s 
damages opinion inadmissible in a variety of different contexts.  In TV 
Interactive Data Corp. v. Sony Corp., for example, the court excluded the opinions 
of a damages expert who based his conclusion regarding a reasonable royalty 
rate on certain rates in patent pools.  The court concluded that the expert 
“failed to show any degree of comparability” between these patent pools and 
the patent at issue in the suit and thus was not allowed to “refer to the royalty 
rates for the patent pools.”88 
In DataQuill Ltd. v. High Tech Computer Corp., the court struck a portion of the 
plaintiff expert’s reasonable royalty analysis where the expert relied on license 
agreements for large patent portfolios executed by large companies, even 
though only two patents were at issue in the litigation and the patentee was a 
small company.  The court determined that the expert had not shown that the 
agreements upon which the expert relied were “economically comparable,” 
even though the court conceded that the expert had provided evidence that the 
licenses were “technologically comparable.”89  The court observed that “[t]he 
testimony of a damages expert in a patent suit who relies on non-comparable 
licenses in reaching his royalty rate should be excluded.”90 
In Mondis Technology, Ltd. v. LG Electronics, Inc., the court excluded in part the 
opinions of plaintiff’s damages expert who relied on certain treble rate 
provisions in various licenses to argue that the royalty rate should be tripled.91  
The court observed that the provisions upon which the expert relied were 
                                                                                                                   
 85 Id. at *3. 
 86 Id. at *2. 
 87 Id. at *4. 
 88 TV Interactive Data Corp. v. Sony Corp., 929 F. Supp. 2d 1006, 1017 (N.D. Cal. 2013). 
 89 Data Quill Ltd. v. High Tech. Computer Corp., 887 F. Supp. 2d 999, 1022, 1024 (S.D. Cal. 
2011). 
 90 Id. at 1022. 
 91 Mondis Tech., Ltd. v. LG Elecs., Inc., No. 2:07-CV-565-TJW-CE, 2011 WL 2417367 (E.D. 
Tex. June 14, 2011). 
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penalty provisions that were designed to discourage the licensee from 
challenging or participating in a challenge to the validity of the patents.92  The 
court concluded that, “[a]s penalty clauses, they would not be relevant for the 
purpose that [plaintiff’s expert] intends to use them — that is — to show that 
by removing the ‘uncertainty’ of invalidity, the royalty rate would be tripled.”93   
Finally, in Inventio AG v. Thyssenkrupp Elevator Corp., the court barred 
plaintiff’s damages expert from testifying regarding the defendant corporation’s 
total revenues.  The court concluded that the defendant’s “overall revenues are 
irrelevant” to the issue of damages and therefore inadmissible under Rule 702.94  
In addition, the court found that such testimony would be inadmissible under 
Rule 403 as unduly prejudicial.95 
  c.  Reliability of Underlying Data and Analysis.  The reliability of the data can 
also be grounds for exclusion.  In IP Innovation L.L.C. v. Red Hat, Inc., for 
example, the court observed that “[a] reliable reasonable royalty calculation 
depends on trustworthy evidence of both the royalty base and the royalty 
rate.”96  The court concluded that the expert’s damages calculation relating to a 
desktop switching feature failed to meet this standard given that the expert had 
no reliable basis for the expert’s reasonable royalty calculation.97  The court 
observed that “selected users’ statements in isolation and without a relationship 
to the actual claimed technology do not show an accurate economic 
measurement of total market demand for the switching feature, let alone its 
contribution to the demand for the entire product asserted as the royalty 
base.”98  The court found that “[t]he workspace switching feature’s small role in 
the overall product is further confirmed when one considers the relative 
importance of certain other features such as security, interoperability, and 
virtualization.”99  The court noted that the record was contrary to the expert’s 
assumptions given that “users do not buy the accused operating systems for 
their workspace switching feature.”100 
In addition, the court observed that the damages expert “arbitrarily picked a 
royalty rate that is much higher than the existing royalty rates for licenses to the 
patents-in-suit.”101  The expert had used a royalty rate for the “software 
                                                                                                                   
 92 Id. 
 93 Id. at *6. 
 94 Inventio AG v. Thyssenkrupp Elevator Corp., No. 08-874-RGA, 2014 WL 554853, at *3 
(D. Del. Feb. 6, 2014). 
 95 Id. 
 96 IP Innovation LLC v. Red Hat, Inc., 705 F. Supp. 2d 687, 689 (E.D. Tex. 2010). 
 97 Id. at 691. 
 98 Id. at 690. 
 99 Id. 
 100 Id. 
 101 Id. at 690–91. 
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industry,” which the court indicated encompassed much more than the desktop 
switching feature that was at issue in the case.102  The expert offered “no 
evidence that the alleged industry agreements are in any way comparable to the 
patents-in-suit.”103 At the same time, the expert disregarded prior license 
agreements that involved one or more of the patents-in-suit.  The court 
observed that “these licenses are far more relevant than the general market 
studies on which [the expert] primarily relied in his expert report.”104  
Accordingly, the expert not only relied on data that was not particularly relevant 
or reliable but failed to consider data that the court found was directly relevant 
to the reasonable royalty calculation. 
In Info-Hold, Inc. v. Muzak LLC, the court similarly excluded an expert’s 
damages analysis because, among other things, the expert’s analysis was not 
reliable.105  The court found that one basis for exclusion was the fact that the 
patentee’s expert had conducted “no independent analysis”; rather, he “relie[d], 
without verification, on Plaintiff’s employees and Plaintiff’s counsel for 
information crucial to his opinions.”106  The court concluded that this violated 
Rule 702 because “an expert’s testimony must be based on independent analysis 
and objective proof.”107 
In ABT Systems, LLC v. Emerson Electric Co., the court excluded in part the 
opinions of plaintiff’s damages expert on the ground that they lacked a reliable 
basis.108  The expert based his opinion regarding a reasonable royalty rate in part 
on a trade brochure and the face of the touchscreen of the accused products, 
which he concluded suggested that the patented feature (a “CCF feature”) 
“could be the most important feature” of the product, which had a “significant 
upward impact on the royalty rate derived for the patents-in-suit.”109  The court 
concluded that this opinion was “neither warranted by the facts relied upon by 
[the expert], nor the result of reliable principles and methods.”110  Accordingly, 
the court determined that it violated the principle that “ ‘[a] damages theory 
must be based on ‘sound economic and factual predicates.’ ”111 
                                                                                                                   
 102 Id. at 691. 
 103 Id.  
 104 Id.  
 105 Info-Hold, Inc. v. Muzak LLC, No. 1:11-cv-283, 2013 WL 4482442, at *5 (S.D. Ohio Aug. 
20, 2013). 
 106 Id. 
 107 Id. 
 108 ABT Sys., LLC v. Emerson Elec. Co., No. 4:11CV0374 AGF, 2013 WL 490174 (E.D. Mo. 
Feb. 8, 2013). 
 109 Id. at *2. 
 110 Id.  
 111 Id. (quoting Riles, 298 F.3d at 1311). 
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In AVM Technologies, LLC v. Intel Corp., the court excluded the opinion of 
plaintiff’s damages expert regarding a reasonable royalty based on a single 
licensing agreement that resulted from a settlement of prior litigation.112  The 
court noted that plaintiff’s expert failed to explain why the agreement alone 
could be the basis “for an accurate conclusion about the hypothetical 
negotiation over the ‘547 patent.”113  The litigation settlement related to a 
different patent and was executed five years after the hypothetical negotiation 
would have taken place.  The court found that reliance on this lone agreement 
was “completely speculative without, at a minimum, some analysis of the 
litigation that led to the settlement.”114  “Without analysis of the litigation, the 
conclusion cannot be based on ‘sound economic and factual predicates.’ ”115  
Moreover, the court concluded that “[w]hereas multiple settlement agreements 
might show a pattern, a single settlement agreement on a different patent 
without any analysis of the settlement context is not a reliable method for 
calculating damages.”116  And it noted that “[a]n analysis that relies on a single 
license agreement but does not take into account why other licenses are not 
comparable cannot be a reliable analysis.”117 
  d.  Lack of Evidentiary Support.  Where an expert fails to support key 
aspects of the expert’s damages opinion or makes unsupported assumptions, 
the damages opinions may likewise be subject to exclusion.  In Rolls-Royce PLC 
v. United Technologies Corp., for example, the court limited the opinions of 
plaintiff’s damages expert in a case involving alleged infringement of a patent 
relating to the design of jet engine fan blades.  The court concluded that the 
expert’s opinion regarding price erosion damages was unsupported.  While the 
expert asserted that jet engines were a “necessity” and thus the plaintiff would 
have been able to charge twice as much for its engines absent infringement, the 
expert did not “cite any evidence for the proposition that a jet engine is a 
necessity in the same way as is milk.”118  Likewise, the court concluded that 
there was “insufficient evidence” to support the expert’s use of the entire 
market value of the engines in calculating lost profits.  The court found that the 
expert’s opinion regarding “price erosion and lost profits damage is based on 
misstatements of the law, a lack of sound evidence, and unsupported 
                                                                                                                   
 112 AVM Tech., LLC v. Intel Corp., 927 F. Supp. 2d 139 (D. Del. 2013). 
 113 Id. at 143. 
 114 Id.  
 115 Id. (quoting Riles, 298 F.3d at 1311). 
 116 Id. at 144. 
 117 Id. 
 118 Rolls-Royce PLC v. United Tech. Corp., No. 1:10CV457, 2011 WL 1740143, at *4 (E.D. Va. 
May 4, 2011).  
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assumptions” and that his paid up royalty theory was similarly flawed.119  
Finally, the court noted that the expert’s report “reads more like a lawyer’s brief 
advocating for the highest conceivable damage award rather than an expert 
trying to assist the trier of fact reach a reasonable damages figure.”  “Because of 
this extensive overreaching, the entire report is undermined.”120 
In Bowling v. Hasbro, Inc., the court similarly excluded an expert’s opinions on 
the ground that they were not sufficiently supported.  The court noted that the 
expert’s report and testimony “reveal[ed] that no rigorous analysis was 
performed,” but “rather the witness engaged in a superficial and result oriented 
application of the Georgia-Pacific methodology.”121  Indeed, the court concluded 
that the analysis “lacks sufficient reference to facts, data, or any relevant 
information at all.”122  The court concluded that the expert’s assumption that 
the relationship between plaintiff and defendant would have been one of 
supplier and customer was particularly unsupported and was used to artificially 
inflate the royalty rate.  As the court noted, “an expert opinion is not admissible 
when it is connected to existing data only by the ipse dixit of an expert.”123  In 
particular the expert admitted that he had “no particular starting point” for his 
analysis of the appropriate royalty rate and was relying solely upon his own 
experience.124   
In addition, the court concluded that there was no attempt to “connect the 
Georgia-Pacific factors” to the expert’s “ultimate conclusion as to the reasonable 
royalty rate.”125  Rather, the court concluded that the expert conducted only a 
superficial analysis of the Georgia-Pacific factors “in order to reason backwards to 
his pre-ordained conclusion.”126  Accordingly, the court concluded that it was 
“apparent” that the expert “drafted a report specifically intended to superficially 
justify a royalty rate that would maximize damages” and that the expert’s 
opinions “lack a dependable foundation, are not reliable, and for this reason 
must be excluded.”127 
Finally, in Carnegie Mellon University v. Marvell Technology Group, Ltd., the court 
excluded an expert’s damages opinions on the ground that certain elements had 
no “factual predicate.”128  Specifically, the court noted that the plaintiff 
                                                                                                                   
 119 Id. at *9. 
 120 Id. 
 121 Bowling v. Hasbro, Inc., No. 05-2295, 2008 WL 717741, at *4 (D.R.I. Mar. 17, 2008). 
 122 Id. 
 123 Id. 
 124 Id. 
 125 Id. at *6. 
 126 Id.  
 127 Id. at *7. 
 128 Carnegie Mellon Univ. v. Marvell Tech. Grp. Ltd., No. 09-290, 2012 WL 5409800, at *3 
(W.D. Pa. Nov. 6, 2012). 
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university’s contention that the infringement had adversely affected its ability to 
attract top faculty or students, resulted in unspecified “lost opportunities,” and 
diminished its capacity to fulfill its mission were unsupported.  The court noted 
that “[w]ithout any factual support, these supposed ‘harms’ are speculative, not 
relevant, and, if presented at trial, would complicate the issues and confuse the 
jury.”129  The court similarly excluded evidence of alleged damage to the 
university’s reputation and standing in the university community, holding that 
“such evidence is not relevant to the hypothetical negotiation, and, if presented 
at trial, will only tend to confuse the issues and mislead the jury.”130 
  e.  Intersection with Patent Law.  The admissibility of expert evidence under 
Rule 702 and Daubert may be inextricably interlinked with the court’s decisions 
regarding substantive patent issues.  In one recent decision that received 
significant publicity, for example, Seventh Circuit Judge Richard Posner, sitting 
by designation as a district court judge in the Northern District of Illinois, 
issued an opinion holding inadmissible proposed testimony by three of the 
parties’ damages experts in a case involving patents relating to smartphones, 
effectively ending the litigation in a decision that the Federal Circuit 
subsequently reversed on appeal based largely on the court’s determination that 
errors in claim construction infected the district court’s decisions regarding 
admissibility of expert damages testimony.131   
While the Federal Circuit reversed Judge Posner’s decision on the 
admissibility of the expert evidence, the court focused heavily on substantive 
patent law issues.  First, the court concluded that the ruling was based “on an 
incorrect claim construction” which, “alone, would require reversal and 
remand” because it “tainted the district court’s damages analysis.”132  Thus, the 
court observed that, by engaging in what the Federal Circuit considered to be 
an “overly narrow” construction of the claims, the district court improperly 
concluded that the expert’s damages analysis “was too far removed from the 
asserted claims.”133  The other error the Federal Circuit found in the district 
court’s analysis was that it allegedly failed to consider “the full scope of 
infringement,” and as a result “incorrectly focused on individual claim 
limitations in isolation” in evaluating the reliability of the expert opinions.134   
The Federal Circuit’s decision illustrates the complex ways in which 
evidentiary issues under Rule 702 and Daubert may intersect with substantive 
                                                                                                                   
 129 Id. (citations omitted). 
 130 Id. at *4 (citations omitted). 
 131 See Apple, Inc. v Motorola, Inc., No. 1:11-w-6840, 2012 WL 1959560 (N.D. Ill. May 22, 
2012). 
 132 Apple Inc. v. Motorola, Inc., 757 F.3d 1286, 1315–16 (Fed. Cir. 2014). 
 133 Id. at 1317. 
 134 Id.  
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issues in patent cases.  In many ways, the Federal Circuit’s decision in Apple is 
more about substantive issues regarding claim construction and infringement 
than it is about Rule 702.  Accordingly, Daubert analyses in the context of patent 
cases may prove more complex in some situations than in other kinds of cases.  
  f.  Expert Qualifications.  Finally, limitations in an expert’s qualifications 
have also been a basis for exclusion.  While the Federal Circuit has only rarely 
addressed expert qualifications as a basis for exclusion, it has upheld at least one 
district court ruling on this ground.  In State Contracting & Engineering Corp. v. 
Condotte America, Inc., the court affirmed the exclusion of a damages expert who 
acknowledged that he had “no experience in placing a value on a patent and did 
not have any knowledge regarding reasonable royalties for construction-related 
patents.”135  However, such challenges have arisen more frequently in the 
district courts, typically as part of a broader Daubert motion challenging not only 
the expert’s qualifications, but also the expert’s methodology. 
In Sloan Valve Co. v. Zurn Industries, Inc., for example, the court excluded 
portions of the testimony of plaintiff’s employee-expert on the issue of price 
erosion damages based on a lack of expertise.136  The court found that plaintiff’s 
expert lacked any background in economics and had no experience conducting 
economic analyses.  Moreover, he had no specific experience in pricing or 
selling plumbing valves, the product at issue, let alone analyzing price erosion or 
determining the effect of a higher price on product demand.137  As a result, 
plaintiffs’ expert did not perform any economic studies to support his opinion 
that plaintiff could have charged a higher price without any diminishing sales.  
The court observed, however, that “in a credible economic analysis, the 
patentee cannot show entitlement to a higher price divorced from the effect of 
that higher price on demand for the product.”  The court reasoned that “the 
patentee must also present evidence of the (presumably reduced) amount of 
product the patentee would have sold at the higher price.”138 
A broad lack of qualifications may result in a broader exclusion.  In Info-
Hold, Inc. v. Muzak LLC, for example, the court concluded that an expert was 
not qualified to offer a damages opinion at all where the expert had never 
testified as a damages expert in a patent case before and had no prior 
experience with patent damages calculations.139  Accordingly, the court excluded 
the expert’s opinions in their entirety under Rule 702 and Daubert. 
                                                                                                                   
 135 State Contracting & Eng’g Corp. v. Condotte Am., Inc., 346 F.3d 1057, 1073 (Fed. Cir. 
2003). 
 136 Sloan Value Co. v. Zurn Inc., No. 16-w-60204, 2014 WL 806452 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 28, 2014). 
 137 Id. at *3–4. 
 138 Id. at *4 (quoting Crystal Semiconductor Corp. v. TriTech Microelectronics Int’l., Inc., 246 F.3d 1336, 
1357 (Fed. Cir. 2001)). 
 139 Muzak LLC, 2013 WL 4482442, at *2. 
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B.  LIABILITY 
As challenges to expert evidence in patent cases have become more 
common, they have expanded into other areas.  No longer is the focus solely on 
expert damages testimony.  Rather, parties are filing motions to exclude a 
variety of expert opinions relating to liability, including opinions concerning 
claim construction, infringement, validity and enablement, among other things.  
These motions draw upon the general principles developed in other kinds of 
cases and are becoming increasingly common. 
1.  The Federal Circuit.  The Federal Circuit has only rarely addressed the 
admissibility of expert opinions outside the damages context.  In Pharmastem 
Therapeutics, Inc. v. Viacell, Inc., for example, the Federal Circuit held that the 
contributory infringement opinion of the patentee’s cell biology expert was not 
helpful to the jury and not an appropriate subject for expert evidence in a case 
involving alleged infringement of patents describing a process for collecting 
newborn infants’ umbilical cord blood and preserving it through 
cryopreservation.140  The court affirmed the district court, noting that the expert 
simply quoted “promotional information and other materials in which the 
defendants described their business operations for potential customers” and 
drew certain “inferences from those materials.”141  The court concluded that the 
district court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that the jury was capable 
of understanding those materials without expert assistance.142   
The court further observed that the expert conducted little analysis and what 
analysis she did perform was flawed.  Specifically, the court found that because 
the expert’s testimony was “almost entirely based on an interpretation of 
defendants’ marketing materials and materials directed to investors,” any 
expertise the expert had as a cell biologist “was of no apparent help to the jury” 
in interpreting such materials.143  Moreover, the court concluded that the 
expert’s interpretation of these materials was “unreasonable” since they did not 
represent that preserved cord blood samples contained a sufficient number of 
stem cells to reconstitute an adult, as the expert maintained.144  
2.  The District Courts.  While the Federal Circuit has not issued much in the 
way of guidance concerning the application of Rule 702 to expert opinions 
relating to liability issues, the district courts have frequently addressed such 
questions.  Drawing upon general principles governing the admissibility of 
                                                                                                                   
 140 Pharmastem Therapeutics, Inc. v. Viacell, Inc., 491 F.3d 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
 141 Id. at 1354. 
 142 Id. 
 143 Id. at 1355. 
 144 Id.  
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expert opinions under Rule 702, they have excluded or limited expert testimony 
on a variety of different grounds. 
  a.  Reliability and Scientific Support.  District courts have excluded expert 
opinions, for example, where they have found that the expert’s analysis was not 
reliable or was unsupported.  In Brandeis v. Keebler Co., for example, Judge 
Posner, sitting again by designation, excluded certain opinions of experts 
seeking to testify about liability issues in patent litigation over margarines used 
in Keebler cookies that had positive effects on cholesterol.  While the court did 
not exclude the opinions of plaintiffs’ infringement and validity expert in their 
entirety, it did exclude opinions regarding the positive health effects of the 
patented margarine based on studies in monkeys.  The court found that the 
expert was “unable to evaluate the significance of studies on monkeys for 
human consumption, other than to say that monkeys are genetically rather 
similar to human beings.”145  As the court observed, “ ‘[i]n order for animal 
studies to be admissible to prove causation in humans, there must be good 
grounds to extrapolate from animals to humans.’ ”146 
The court took a similarly targeted approach to Keebler’s expert.  Keebler’s 
expert critiqued the studies plaintiff relied on to support the health effects of 
the patented margarine and concluded that the findings regarding beneficial 
health effects could not be “generalized to all fat blends within the claimed 
range, and therefore that the patent does not enable reproduction of the 
patented product.”147  In support of her opinions, she cited certain other studies 
indicating that some fat blends within the patent’s ranges did not produce the 
claimed health effects.  The court concluded that the expert could discuss those 
studies and testify that they “cast doubt” on the validity of the study upon 
which plaintiff’s expert relied, but could not testify that the studies “directly 
contradict” plaintiff’s study “because of . . . differences in experimental 
designs.”148 
Finally, the court excluded opinions of another of Keebler’s experts based 
on testing conducted in the expert’s home.  Keebler’s expert opined that the fat 
mixture that Keebler used was not really a margarine at all because it was not a 
stable emulsion.  In rejecting this opinion as based on an unreliable 
methodology, the court concluded: “Conducting a test in one’s home of a 
product that has been in transit for 36 hours strikes me as unprofessional; there 
is no suggestion that it is an industry practice.”149 
                                                                                                                   
 145 Brandeis Univ. v. Keebler Co., No. 1:12-cv-01508, 2013 WL 5911233, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 
18, 2013). 
 146 Id. (quoting In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig., 35 F.3d 717, 743 (3d Cir. 1994)). 
 147 Id.  
 148 Id. at *5. 
 149 Id. 
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In XpertUniverse, Inc. v. Cisco Systems, Inc., the court similarly excluded certain 
opinions by the defendant’s technical expert.  The court concluded that the 
expert could not offer the opinion that the source code he analyzed was 
executed or implemented in prior art (specific demonstrations that were offered 
before the critical date).  The court found that the expert had failed to provide 
“any reliable basis for drawing this inference based on his expertise.”150  The 
expert indicated that in reaching this opinion, he had compared code text to 
screen shots in user manuals and other documents, which the court found “falls 
short of a reliable opinion based on [the expert’s] scientific, technical, or 
specialized knowledge, as required by Rule 702.”151  The court further found 
that there was a danger of unfair prejudice under Rule 403 from such testimony 
and that this ultimate conclusion was more properly left for the jury to decide. 
In Magnetar Technologies Corp. and G&T Conveyer Co. v. Six Flags Theme Parks 
Inc., a magistrate judge concluded that an expert’s infringement opinion relating 
to patents for magnetic brakes “lack[ed] the proper grounds for his conclusions, 
because it [was] void of the necessary analysis for comparing each element of 
the claim to the accused product.”152  As the court observed, to establish 
infringement, it was necessary to show that every limitation set forth in the 
patent claim was in the accused product or process exactly or by substantial 
equivalent.  The court noted that the “ ‘patentee’s expert must set forth the 
factual foundation for his infringement opinion in sufficient detail for the court 
to be certain that features of the accused product would support a finding of 
infringement under the claim construction adopted by the court. . . .’ ”153  The 
expert’s opinion was inadmissible because it did not contain the required 
analysis, but rather merely “conclusory statements,”154 citing the claim 
limitations and providing only some general references to documents or 
depositions without explaining “why the documents or deposition are relevant 
to the technology involved” or the claims at issue.155  As the court observed, 
quoting the Supreme Court’s decision in Joiner, “ ‘nothing in either Daubert or 
the Federal Rules of Evidence requires a district court to admit opinion 
evidence that is connected to existing data only by the ipse dixit of the 
                                                                                                                   
 150 XpertUniverse, Inc. v. Cisco Sys., Inc., No. 09-157-RGA, 2013 WL 1702159, at *1 (D. Del. 
Feb. 25, 2013). 
 151 Id. 
 152 Magnetar Technologies Corp. v. Six Flags Theme Parks Inc., No. 07-127-LPS-MPT, 2014 
WL 529983, at *6 (D. Del. Feb. 7, 2014). 
 153 Id. (quoting Intellectual Sci. & Tech., Inc., 589 F.3d 1179, 1183 (Fed. Cir. 2009)). 
 154 Id. 
 155 Id. at *8. 
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expert.’ ”156  An expert cannot “provide[ ] data and a conclusion, with the 
chasm between not bridged by any analysis.”157   
Finally, an expert’s failure to eliminate alternative explanations for 
observations supporting an infringement opinion can be a basis for exclusion.  
In Furminator v. Kim Laube & Co., for example, the court excluded the opinions 
of an accused infringer’s expert as unreliable under Rule 702 and Daubert.  The 
expert offered the opinion that both the accused pet grooming tool and the 
patented tool cut non-loose hair from furry pets.  However, the court observed 
that the expert’s opinion did not “properly account for the presence of cut or 
fractured hairs that were caused by circumstances not related to the use of the 
tools at issue in this case.”158  The expert therefore failed to effectively eliminate 
potential alternative causes for the observations he made, rendering the expert’s 
unreliable.159  
  b.  General Acceptance and Scientific Support.  Lack of support for an expert’s 
methodology or acceptance within the scientific community may be a related 
basis for exclusion of an expert’s opinions.  In Carnegie Mellon University v. 
Hoffmann-LaRoche, Inc., for example, the court excluded the plaintiffs’ scientific 
expert, largely because his opinions were inconsistent with the views of the 
scientific community.160  The court observed that, “[w]hile Daubert forbids the 
exclusion of expert testimony on the basis of a rigid ‘general acceptance’ test, it 
does not wholly remove this factor from consideration.”161  “A reliability 
assessment . . . does permit[ ] explicit identification of a relevant scientific 
community and an express determination of a particular degree of acceptance 
within that community.”162  The court concluded that the expert’s opinion that 
Taq DNA polymerase does not exhibit 3’–5’ exonuclease activity was inconsistent 
with the view in the scientific community.  As the court observed, a number of 
treatises and articles published in peer-reviewed journals refuted this 
contention.163  In addition, the court noted that “[l]ike the expert in Joiner,” the 
expert had “analyzed data that was not his own and reinterpreted it in a manner 
inconsistent with the conclusions of those who originally generated it.”164 
In Trivitis, Inc. v. Ocean Spray Cranberries, Inc., the court similarly excluded 
testimony by an expert on mass spectronomy and HPLC analysis on the ground 
                                                                                                                   
 156 Id. (quoting Joiner, 522 U.S. at 146). 
 157 Id. at *12. 
 158 Furminator v. Kim Laube & Co., 758 F. Supp. 2d 797, 808 (E.D. Mo. 2010). 
 159 Id.  
 160 Carnegie Mellon Univ. v Hoffman-LaRoche, Inc., 55 F. Supp. 2d 1024, 1032–33 (N.D. Cal. 
1999). 
 161 Id. at 1032 (quoting Daubert, 509 U.S. at 594). 
 162 Id. 
 163 Id. at 1031–32. 
 164 Id. 
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that his methodology was unsupported.  Instead of relying on ultraviolet 
detection, the expert relied upon light scattering detection, which the court 
characterized as “unconventional.”165  The expert failed to support his assertion 
that this was an established, pre-litigation methodology that he had used before, 
that light-scattering detection is an appropriate form of detection, and that the 
testing was conducted in a scientifically acceptable manner.  The court rejected 
plaintiff’s argument that the fact that mass spectronomy and HPLC were 
accepted methodologies was sufficient to carry plaintiff’s burden.  Finally, the 
court rejected affidavits plaintiff submitted in an attempt to validate the light-
scattering methodology.  The affidavits failed to set forth the qualifications of 
the experts who purported to validate the methodology and did not sufficiently 
establish that the methodology was reliable.166 
  c.  Opinions Contrary to Claim Construction.  The admissibility of expert 
opinions relating to liability issues may overlap with substantive patent law 
issues, just as it does in the context of expert damages testimony.  For example, 
courts have excluded expert opinions in certain circumstances where they were 
contrary to the court’s claim construction or governing legal principles or where 
the expert was seeking to offer what amounted to legal opinions.167  These 
courts have followed guidance from the Federal Circuit and other courts, which 
on occasion have noted “the impropriety of patent lawyers testifying as expert 
witnesses and giving their opinion regarding the proper interpretation of a claim 
as a matter of law, the ultimate issue for the court to decide.”168  Despite these 
restrictions, experts are sometimes in appropriate circumstances permitted to 
testify regarding how individuals with ordinary skill in the art understand claim 
terms. 
In MediaTek, Inc. v. Freescale Semiconductor, Inc., for example, the court 
excluded certain opinions from plaintiff’s claim construction expert on the 
ground that they relied largely on the prosecution of the patent at issue.169  The 
court observed “ ‘[a]t trial, parties may “introduce[e] evidence as to the plain 
and ordinary meaning of terms not construed by the Court to one skilled in the 
art,” so long as the evidence does not amount to “argu[ing] claim construction to 
                                                                                                                   
 165 Trivitis, Inc. v. Ocean Spray Cranberries, Inc., No. 101CV0316, 2012 WL 1944827, at *5 
(S.D. Cal. May 29, 2012). 
 166 Id. at *6. 
 167 Hochstein v. Microsoft Corp., No. 04-73071, 2009 WL 2022815, at *1 (E.D. Mich. July 7, 
2009) (excluding expert’s opinion to the extent it was inconsistent with special master’s construction 
of claim as not including the requirement that data circuits be physically connected to the 
communication medium). 
 168 Endress + Hauser, Inc. v. Hawk Measurement Sys. Pty. Ltd., 122 F.3d 1040, 1042 (Fed. Cir. 
1997). 
 169 MediaTek, Inc. v. Freescale Semiconductor, Inc., 2014 WL 971765, No. 11-cv-53414GR, at 
*6 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 5, 2014). 
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the jury.” ’ ”170  However, the court concluded that, “except in a rare case, use 
of the prosecution history raises issues solely for the court, not the jury.”171   
Thus testimony grounded in the prosecution history to discern 
the meaning of a claim is properly excluded from presentation to 
the jury, especially where, as here, a fair reading of the expert 
report reveals an intention to argue claim construction.  Similarly, 
while the court may in its discretion, consider extrinsic evidence if 
such sources will aid the court in determining “the true meaning 
of language used in the patent claims,” such evidence, if required, 
is not appropriate for presentation to a jury and is properly 
excluded at trial.172 
In Personalized Media Communications, LLC v. Zynga, Inc., the court similarly 
excluded opinions offered by defendant’s enablement expert, finding that his 
opinions were based on an inaccurate legal standard.173  The court observed that 
“the Federal Circuit has clearly and explicitly held that ‘[t]he dispositive question 
of enablement does not turn on whether the accused product is enabled.’ ”174  
Yet, defendant’s expert focused on use of the accused products as “the 
touchstone for enablement.”175  The court therefore concluded that his 
opinions were not sufficiently relevant and reliable to satisfy the requirements 
of Rule 702 and Daubert. 
In The Medicines Co. v. Mylan Inc., the court excluded in part the opinions of 
plaintiff’s expert regarding the defendant’s drug compounding process.176  The 
court had ruled at the summary judgment stage that the compounding process 
the defendant used was not directly relevant to infringement because the 
asserted claims in the patent-in-suit did not contain process limitations.177  The 
process was only “indirectly relevant” to infringement insofar as it might affect 
whether Mylan’s bivalirudin drug product would infringe the maximum 
impurities limitation of the asserted claims.178  Accordingly, the court held that 
the expert could not opine regarding whether Mylan’s compounding process 
                                                                                                                   
 170 Id. at *4. 
 171 Id. at *5. 
 172 Id. 
 173 Personalized Media Communications, LLC v. Zynga, Inc., No. 2:12-cv-0068-JRG-RSP, 2013 
WL 5962812 (E.D. Tex. Nov. 7, 2013). 
 174 Id. at *2 (quoting Durel Corp. v. Osram Sylvania Inc., 256 F.3d 1298, 1306 (Fed. Cir. 2001)). 
 175 Id. 
 176 The Medicines Co. v. Mylan Inc., No. 11-cv-1285, 2014 WL 1929360, at *5 (N.D.  Ill. May 
15, 2014). 
 177 Id. at *1. 
 178 Id. at *5. 
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was “efficient,” but could testify as to how it would affect the characteristics of 
the bivalirudin drug product it generated.179 
In EZ Dock, Inc. v. Schafer Systems, Inc., the court excluded the testimony of 
plaintiff’s technical expert where the expert acknowledged that he was “not 
qualified to provide expert testimony on the operations of the PTO or how to 
construe claims.”180  Moreover, the court noted that “it is the Court’s duty to 
instruct the jury on the applicable principles of patent law, just as claim 
construction is an issue for the Court and not the jury.”181  Accordingly, the 
court held that these were not proper subjects for expert testimony.182 
Finally, in Astrazeneca UK Ltd. v. Watson Labs., Inc., the court excluded the 
testimony of a legal expert who planned to testify that an experienced chemical 
patent practitioner would read neither the patent’s claims nor prosecution 
history as affirmatively limiting the patent’s description of the invention and the 
scope of the salts that were equivalent.183  The court found that the expert was 
not a person of ordinary skill in the art of the patent-in-suit and was offering 
what amounted to impermissible legal opinions.184 
  d.  Parties’ Intent.  Experts seeking to testify about a party’s intent when 
taking certain actions before the Patent Office may find themselves subject to a 
Daubert challenge seeking to limit or exclude their opinions.185  In The Medicines 
Co. v. Mylan Inc., for example, the court excluded the defense expert’s opinions 
regarding the state of mind of the inventors and their intent to deceive the 
Patent Office regarding the applications and examination of the patent-in-suit.  
The court concluded that “[p]atent experts may not testify that they know the 
patentee’s intent to hide or lie about certain information during the patent 
prosecution process ‘because they are not mind readers.’ ”186  Likewise, “patent 
experts may not ‘plumb the inventor’s and attorney’s minds and discern 
whether they ‘lacked candor’ or had actual intent to deceive during the patent 
prosecution process.’ ”187   Accordingly the court excluded any expert testimony 
regarding the parties’ intent, while indicating that the expert could identify facts 
from the file history and record to support an inference that the applicant acted 
                                                                                                                   
 179 Id. 
 180 EZ Dock, Inc. v. Schafer Systems, Inc., No. CIV. 98-7364, 2003 WL 1610781, at *7 (D. 
Minn. Mar. 8, 2003). 
 181 Id. 
 182 Id.  
 183 Astrazeneca UK Ltd. v. Watson Labs., Inc., 2012 WL 5900686, at *1–2 (D. Del. Nov. 14, 
2012). 
 184 Id. at *2. 
 185 2014 WL 1758135, at *5. 
 186 Id. (quoting Bone Care Int’l, LLC v. Pentech Pharm., Inc., No. 08-CV-1083, 2010 WL 3894444, 
at *9 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 1, 2010)). 
 187 Id. 
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with intent to deceive.188  Similarly, the court excluded expert opinions 
regarding what the Patent Office examiner would have done if given different 
information as speculation.189  Nonetheless, the court indicated that it would 
allow testimony as to what the expert believed would have been material to the 
patent examiner.190 
  e.  Expert Qualifications.  Finally, a lack of qualifications may also 
undermine an expert’s opinions.  In TASER International, Inc. v. Karbon Arms, 
LLC, for example, the court excluded the opinion of an expert who admittedly 
had no expertise in electrophysiology.191 While defendants argued that the 
expert’s testimony concerned only electrical engineering and not 
electrophysiology specifically, the court concluded that there were “numerous 
instances” where the expert offered opinions in the area of electrophysiology in 
rebutting the opinions of plaintiff’s expert.192  The court therefore excluded 
these opinions as outside the expert’s area of expertise.193 
Similarly, in Trivitis, Inc. v. Ocean Spray Cranberries, Inc., the court excluded the 
testimony of the patent holder and CEO of the plaintiff company who sought 
to testify as an expert on HPLC and mass spectronomy.194  The court noted 
that, while the patent holder had a degree in mathematics, he did not have a 
degree in chemistry and testified that his only formal chemistry education was a 
high school chemistry class and college chemistry courses.195  Moreover, the 
expert offered only “conclusory” assertions that he had experience and training 
in HPLC and mass spectrometry.  Accordingly, the court concluded that 
plaintiff failed to meet the threshold showing that the expert was qualified to 
present testimony on HPLC or mass spectronomy.196 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
These examples demonstrate the increasing frequency with which parties are 
filing motions seeking the exclusion of expert opinions under Rule 702 and 
Daubert in patent cases as well as the diversity of circumstances in which such 
challenges arise.  Scrutiny of expert damages opinions under Rule 702 is 
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 189 Id. at *7. 
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 191 Taser Int’l, Inc. v. Karbon Arms, LLC, No. 11-426-R0A, 2013 WL 6705478 (D. Del. Dec. 
18, 2013). 
 192 Id. at *1. 
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frequently undertaken pursuant to a well-established framework developed by 
the Federal Circuit.  However, challenges to expert opinions involving liability-
related issues are increasingly common.  Here, too, courts may draw upon a 
well-established body of legal principles falling outside the patent context, but 
nonetheless readily lending themselves to application in review of expert 
opinions offered in patent cases. 
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